The EU’s role in developing security cooperation with Myanmar at the ASEAN Regional Forum: 2004-2008 by Marchi, Ludovica
  
Ludovica Marchi 
The EU’s role in developing security 
cooperation with Myanmar at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum: 2004-2008 
 






Marchi, Ludovica (2016) The EU’s role in developing security cooperation with Myanmar at the 




© 2016 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64660/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 




   1 
 
The EU’s Role in Developing Security Cooperation with Myanmar  
at the ASEAN Regional Forum: 2004-2008 
Ludovica Marchi* 
 
Centre for International Studies, Department of International Relations, London School 
of Economics and Political Science 
 
*Email: l.marchi@lse.ac.uk; lmb7979@gmail.com 
 
This article tracks the European Union’s efforts at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), from 
2004 to 2008, to encourage Myanmar directly or indirectly to engage in security cooperation. 
It, then, explores Myanmar and ASEAN’s reactions to the devastation caused by Cyclone 
Nargis to Myanmar’s Irrawaddy delta in 2008. It focuses on ARF as a forum whereby 
interactions take place. It examines whether the complementary of the analytical variables 
provided by the logic of consequences and appropriateness (March & Olsen 1998, 2004), 
social mechanisms (Checkel 1999, 2005) and observations derived from interviews (Southeast 
Asia and Brussels) can explain ASEAN and Myanmar’s reactions and, also, the EU’s 
behaviour in relation to the Myanmar-Nargis event. The EU’s role is explored through the co-
chair’s summary reports of the meetings that the EU co-chaired with ASEAN. The article 
shows that, at ARF, the EU promoted the multilateral aspects of its policy in the field of 
security, and attempted to mobilise the different strengths, values and capacities of its 
partners, i.e. ASEAN and Myanmar. It uncovers the EU’s efforts to encourage both ASEAN 
to take up responsibilities and Myanmar to accept multilateral security options. The article 
argues that, as the EU tried to inspire Myanmar to connect with cooperation, ‘Myanmar hit by 
Cyclone Nargis’ encouraged the EU Council to include the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a new 
goal of the European foreign and security policy of December 2008.  
 
Keywords: EU security cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum, Myanmar, ASEAN, foreign 
policy analysis    
 
Introduction  
At the beginning of 2014, for the first time, the European Union (EU) co-chaired 
meetings with Myanmar, which it hosted in Brussels within the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF, of which the EU has been party since 
its establishment in 1994, is ‘the leading platform in Asia for dialogue and cooperation on 
security’ (EEAS-ARF). It brings together nations across the Asia-Pacific region: the ten 
nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia, China, 
India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States, plus the EU. The 
meetings in Brussels concerned Defence Officials’ Dialogue (DOD) and Inter-sessional 
Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Preventive 
Diplomacy (PD). Discussions on various aspects related to security cooperation in Asia 
were planned. These included, inter alia, ‘humanitarian assistance and disaster relief’ 
(EIAS 2014). The meetings in Brussels are sign that Myanmar is cooperating with the EU 
in the field of security. 
 
Relatively recently (5 March 2013), Myanmar signed an agreement with the EU, the 
‘EU-Myanmar Partnership’. In this document the EU pledged to work with Yangon’s 
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administration on specific issues concerning ‘preparedness, response and resilience to 
emergencies’, and intended to pursue these through ‘building up a professional and 
effective response system’ (EU-MP 2013, 2). This agreement indicates that a Myanmar-
EU security connection exists. Yet, in mid-2014, Myanmar’s government accepted, by 
the EU, the funding of the Myanmar National Crisis Management Centre, which has been 
established in Nay Pyi Taw, the new capital (CMCM 2014). This EU action is indicative 
of its support for capacity development concerning crisis-related responses. 
 
These commitments between Myanmar’s government and the European Union, and 
specifically its external branch, the European External Action Service (EEAS), testify to 
a shift in the Yangon/Nay Pyi Taw government’s attitude. The latter (cautiously) 
detached itself from the rigid non-interference dogma that had characterised its policy 
decisions for decades. Myanmar’s junta had opposed any multilateral options in general, 
and, even more so, with regard to approaching aspects of security (EIAS 2014). These 
events, suggesting the existence of a Myanmar-EU security link, motivate interest in the 
EU’s role in sponsoring cooperation.  
 
This article traces the EU’s attempts at the Forum, from 2004 to 2008, directly or 
indirectly to induce Myanmar’s junta to cooperate in the area of security. Since the 
dialogue and many of the training activities in the ARF framework concerned crisis 
management and disaster relief capacity building, the article, also, investigates Myanmar 
and ASEAN’s reactions to the damage produced by Cyclone Nargis to Myanmar’s 
Irrawaddy delta, in 2008. It focuses on the ARF as a forum in which interactions occur. It 
examines whether the analytical variables provided by the logic of consequences and 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998, 2004), social mechanisms (Checkel 1999, 2005) 
and observations derived from interviews (Southeast Asia and Brussels) in a 
complementary relationship can explain ASEAN and Myanmar’s reactions, and, also, the 
EU’s behaviour in relation to the Myanmar-Nargis event. This investigation exposes the 
EU’s efforts to inspire ASEAN to assume responsibilities, and Myanmar to accept 
multilateral security options. It argues that, as the EU sought to convince Myanmar to 
compromise and accept cooperation, ‘Myanmar hit by Cyclone Nargis’ has encouraged 
the EU Council to insert the ‘responsibility to protect’ goal into the 2008 European 
foreign and security policy.  
 
In the years leading up to the cyclone, the EU antagonised the chosen isolation of 
Myanmar’s junta, specifically in the security area. The EU’s experience as ‘a collective 
and in Asia not yet well known political and security actor’ (Reiterer 2014, 20) and 
advocate of a multilateral approach to security matters inspired the policy proposed at the 
Forum. The EU’s quest to promote security cooperation is explored via examination of 
the meetings that it co-chaired with ASEAN between 2004 and 2008 through the co-
chair’s summary reports. The EU co-chaired the ARF Inter-sessional Group on 
Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy for both 2004/05 and 2006/07 
(Thayer 2009, 78), and the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and 
Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe, in 2008. The article does not focus 
specifically on either of these meetings; combined, they portray the perception of the 
EU’s support for multilateral solutions to security problems, and, neither engages with 
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any of the critique that the ARF is a talking-shop with peripheral outcomes. The 
investigation period is justified by Myanmar being admitted to ARF in 2004 and Cyclone 
Nargis afflicting Myanmar four years later. Since the co-chair’s summary reports offer 
little direct link to Myanmar, connections will be made via ASEAN. Interviews were 




The analytical framework: the variables, their value and complementarity    
This article explores the EU’s attempts at the ARF and the reactions of ASEAN, 
Myanmar and the EU to Cyclone Nargis by focusing on the ARF as a forum in which 
interactions of several interests occur. The latter may include the promotion of one’s own 
identity as well as the publicisation of multilateral security options, or the encouragement 
to undertake security responsibilities. The article also both employs and investigates 
analytical variables in a joint relationship, arguing that their complementarity provides 
explanations: the logic of consequences and appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998, 
2004), social mechanisms (Checkel 1999) and observations derived from interviews 
(Southeast Asia and Brussels).   
 
March and Olsen’s argument  
One of the main tasks of the states participating in the ARF meetings is agreeing together 
how to face external security strains. There has been a specific emphasis on the scope of 
the Forum of ‘reconcil[ing] the differing views between ARF participants’ under the 
conviction that unifying visions would ‘reduce the risk to security’ (ARF-CP 1995). 
Beyond the widespread criticism of the ARF as a ‘talk shop’ with no action (Katsumata 
2006; Thayer 2009, 79), there has been a reported (Haacke), more recent, tendency of the 
ARF to move beyond dialogue towards practical security cooperation. This development 
suggests that common agreement might tend to bridge mere diplomatic declarations with 
more proactive policies (Haacke 2009). National considerations, however, trump 
conceptions of any common, stable ARF as well as ASEAN interest (Acharya 2014; 
Simon 1995). ASEAN members have been determined to retain their national 
prerogatives (Ruland 2010). At the same time, ASEAN strengthened their commitment to 
homogenising their policy in view of the increasing regionalism through Bali Concord II 
(2003), Vientiane Action Programme (2004) and the ASEAN Charter (2007) (deFlers 
2010). ASEAN states have declared their interest in common action, largely on the basis 
that influence and effectiveness in foreign policy is, to a considerable extent, based on 
speaking and working together (ARF-CP 1995).  
 
March and Olsen (1998) contemplate agreeing together via a logic of expected 
consequences, and suggest that the strategic calculation of rational bargaining leads a 
government to defend what it perceives as its national interest. They, however, envisage 
also changes in the logic behind the state-actors. They argue that, when a government 
confronts a position on a policy issue that is relevant to other states of the group to which 
it belongs, that government becomes involved in a new process. The latter supports a 
different behaviour, i.e. frequently the state-actor becomes reconciled with the position of 
those other states. As March and Olsen posit, it might be that a government tends to 
recognise the ethical dimensions and collective norms of the group. In such a situation, a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ motivates its behaviour (pp. 449-51). To act ‘appropriately’ is 
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to proceed according to practices based on a collective, mutual and tacit understanding 
(March and Olsen 2004, 3-4). This logic explains foreign policy as the application of 
rules, associated with specific identities, to specific circumstances (March and Olsen 
1998, 951). A common interpretation of rules is that they exist because they work well 
and provide better solutions than their alternatives (see: Hechter, Opp and Wippler 1990) 
(March and Olsen 2004, 12). Yet, it is also true that the logic of appropriateness does not 
guarantee moral acceptability (p. 4). The division between the two logics is faint. As 
March and Olsen (1998) specify, ‘the descriptive question is whether (or when) one logic 
is more likely than the other to be observed as the basis for actual behaviour’ (p. 949). 
March and Olsen help to analyse why Myanmar initially refused external assistance in 
Nargis’ aftermath, and, why, later, the junta agreed with ASEAN to accept assistance. 
They also highlight why the EU Council included the responsibility to protect 
populations as the new goal of its security policy.  
 
Checkel’s argument  
Whereas March and Olsen shed light on the logic behind the state-actors and the EU 
Council, Checkel highlights developments derived from the interactions within the 
groups and sub-groups that are part of the ARF’s working method (ARF-CP 1995). 
Checkel offers explanatory power to the puzzle of how and through which means actors 
can acquire new interests and preferences (Checkel 1999, 548). This is achieved through 
the observation of the dynamics and practices through which messages migrate and 
spread, namely the social mechanisms, such as group learning, the ability to persuade 
and, also, the crisis and policy failure argument (pp. 548-550). ASEAN’s behaviour in 
the aftermath of the cyclone is subjected to this exploration.  
 
Checkel indicates that ‘social learning is more likely…where a group meets repeatedly 
and there is a high density of interaction among participants…where the group feels itself 
in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure’. A setting 
where agents should be conducive to persuasion, Checkel argues, is most likely ‘when 
the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs 
or wants to belong’. He explains persuasion as a mechanism through which social 
learning may occur and may lead to interest redefinition and identity change (pp. 549-
550). Checkel indicates that social learning can take place through contact with other 
contexts (discursive structures and/or norms) (pp. 548-9). Hence, it is clear that the 
dynamics of socialization are processes which probably develop among actors due to 
their working together, performing common tasks, or taking group decisions, and from all 
kinds of practices which require several exchanges in order to be accomplished. Strictly 
concerning aspects of security or closely related to it, between 2004 and 2005, either for 
consultation or training purposes, several meetings took place, including Disaster relief 
and Peacekeeping meetings. Some of these, such as the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue 
and the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, took place in 
Yangon (ARF library). When consultations have been held outside Myanmar, officials 
from the Yangon administration represented their government at the meetings. Through 
their own representatives, ASEAN, Myanmar and the EU networked together within 
contexts that were potentially affected by social mechanisms.  
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Interviewees’ observations  
While March and Olsen and Checkel usefully contribute to the analysis as outlined, the 
interviewees provide their interpretations regarding the reasons supporting the actors’ 
acquisition of new interests and purposes via the social mechanisms. Several interviewees 
contributed to this discussion, and particularly: ASEAN leaders and leaders close to the 
ARF organisation, Southeast Asian security policy analysts, European Commission 
Rapid Response Coordinator officials, EEAS officials from the Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination, and a Myanmar historian. Hence, the interviewees assist with 
indicating the drives behind ASEAN’s behaviour in Nargis’ aftermath, and those which 
led to the Myanmar junta’s acceptance of ASEAN’s assistance.  
 
Added value and complementarity 
Each of the employed variables adds a distinctive, particular value to the investigation to 
the extent that the analytical strength is expressed by the complementarity of Checkel, 
March and Olsen, and the interviewees. Checkel helpfully reveals how three processes 
(group learning, the ability to persuade and the crisis and policy failure issue) lead to the 
development of new responsibilities and roles. The interviewees’ observations of the 
ARF networking are important in confirming that the above three circumstances exerted 
an influence on the actors’ inclinations. By contrast, March and Olsen’s argument, 
applied to ‘ASEAN’s engagement in crisis support to Myanmar’, would overlook how 
the three conditions indicated by Checkel have the power to motivate others to change 
their behaviour. Checkel’s argument, therefore, by placing emphasis on the significance 
of the interactions and how the discourses generate consequences, provides an added 
value to the investigation. It might be argued that Checkel’s contribution (and that of the 
interviewees) is not necessarily key in explaining ‘ASEAN taking action when it did’, 
and that a realist framework would be a more logical explanation: ASEAN’s support of 
post-Nargis Myanmar would be justifiable by the organisation’s desire to prevent the 
destabilisation of the region. To counter that argument, let it suffice to state that realist 
accounts would be indifferent to the communication and exchanges that took place in the 
ARF. Those processes are central to the investigation, and this scholar’s contribution 
matters.   
 
Whereas Checkel’s framework holds greater weight than that of March and Olsen with 
regard to the causal explanation concerning the transmigration of messages and their 
effect, March and Olsen are valuable under a different viewpoint. They reveal the sources 
which, most logically, explain Myanmar’s junta’s progressive conduct in the post-
cyclone era. The interviewees bring to the fore several arguments, which they explain as 
incentives for the junta to relax its non-interference strategy. Checkel’s social 
mechanisms have little causal reading of the Myanmar junta’s protection of the political 
order and defence of its national interest that, by contrast, March and Olsen emphasise to 
explain the junta’s initial rejection of external help. Hence, with regard to the logic 
informing the actors’ behaviour, these two scholars contribute more argumentative 
elements, and, in this context, their frame possesses more weight than that of Checkel.  
 
As pointed out, interviewees are vital to the investigation. If there were no Myanmar 
historian (and the other officials), the enquiry would provide no suggestions regarding 
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how interests, purposes and priorities can be exposed to processes of transformation. 
Similarly, the secrecy under which security and defence choices were made in the 
ASEAN group would be overlooked, and, equally, the junta’s evolutionary process 
regarding its choices, ignored. The value of the analytical tools employed lay in their 
explanatory capability, and the overall value of their complementarity lay in making the 
whole subject under investigation more logically understandable. In the end, this article 
demonstrates not only the usefulness of these theories but also their complementarity.   
 
The literature on this study area  
Political scientists and observers have increasingly paid attention to Myanmar, with 
regard to security cooperation in Southeast Asia. However, no publications investigating 
the EU’s efforts to encourage security cooperation by connecting with Myanmar and 
ASEAN at the Forum have been found. The most complete publication on the European 
Union and ARF is Weber’s work (2013), which reflected on the EU’s role in promoting 
security in the Asia-Pacific region via the ASEAN Regional Forum; yet she makes only a 
cursory mention of Myanmar. Haacke (2013) published an overview of Southeast Asian 
international relations and security perspectives, with insights into Myanmar’s reactions 
to security incidents; however, his study almost completely ignored the EU. Haacke and 
Morada (2010) provided a perspective on the ARF in terms of cooperative security, 
including traits of policy originating in Myanmar. Yet, their contribution paid no 
attention to the EU.  
 
By contrast, Reiterer (2014) has very recently published an informed and updated 
evaluation of the European Union’s comprehensive approach to security in Asia. 
Nonetheless, his study has offered a very modest outlook on Myanmar. Casarini (2011) 
outlined the security developments in East Asia and the consequences for the EU, but he 
made no mention of Myanmar. Interestingly, Haacke (2009) offered an interpretation of 
the way in which the Forum has moved beyond dialogue towards practical security 
cooperation. He contends that ARF is developing capacity building and operational 
security responses outside, as well as inside, the Forum, and argues that this outcome is 
the result of initiatives supported by a small group of ASEAN and some non-ASEAN 
states. Although, this time, Haacke left Myanmar out of focus, and, similarly, the EU. 
Katsumata (2006) emphasised the efforts of ASEAN, in ARF, to achieve the security of 
the whole region through multilateral security cooperation. This stemmed from the view 
that regional security is indivisible, though this contribution emphasises neither Myanmar 
nor the EU. Heller (2005) argued that the ARF is a forum that reflects the convergence of 
the strategic interests of both the regional and external actors. However, he pays no 
attention to the European Union and virtually ignores Myanmar. Berkofsky (2003) 
discussed ideas regarding the function that the EU should cover, and develop, within 
ARF to enhance security in Asia. Yet, his policy brief gives only a very brief hint about 
Myanmar. Hence, an investigation tying in the EU, Myanmar, and ASEAN, at the ARF 
level, considering the EU’s attempts to inspire security cooperation appears to be 
unavailable. The present study, thus, aims to fill this gap. 
 
The EU and the Forum  
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The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission embodies the European Union at the Forum, and 
participates on behalf of the member states. As the EU likes to assert, the European 
Union has been active in the ARF on account of its ‘overall engagement with a security 
order in Asia’ (EEAS-ARF). The EU’s commitment to the ARF’s consultation on 
regional, political and security matters was confirmed by its conviction that reconciling 
the different views among the participants, ASEAN, Myanmar and the other states, 
enhanced security.  
 
Several groups and sub-groups were organised coherently with ARF’s working 
method both for discussion and training reasons. The ARF Concept Paper specifies that 
decisions are made on the basis of consensus and compliance. The convening of the 
groups is at the inter-governmental level, and the meetings reflect the three stages of 
development of the ARF’s activities: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and 
approach elaboration to conflicts (C-S, ARF 1995). The meetings are, among others, the 
Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy (in 
particular a dialogue on security perceptions and defence policy papers) and the Inter-
sessional Meetings on Cooperative Activities (including, inter alia, disaster relief and 
peacekeeping) (ARF-CP 1995).
2
 The ‘confidence building measures’ are actions meant to 
address, prevent and resolve uncertainties among actors and states, and involve (direct or 
indirect) negotiations (CBMs). ‘Disaster relief measures’ are also discussed and are 
intended to ensure a coordinated response in order to increase the local resilience of the 
people offended by natural, or man-made, disasters (DRMs).  
 
An outline of the engagement in which the EU expressed willingness to participate in 
the ARF is enclosed in the European Commission’s official documents (Marchi 2015, 8-
9). Concerning this paper, it may suffice to recall that the EU has declared that ‘crisis 
management’ and ‘capacity building’ were expected to enrich the EU’s security dialogue 
with ASEAN in the form of knowledge transfer and exchange of best practices (Plan of 
Action 2007, 2). ‘Capacity building’ involved actions focused on the development of 
skills and attitudes in groups and individuals with regard to the formation, management 
and maintenance of processes which were locally meaningful (Howorth 2007). ‘Crisis 
management’, in its civilian aspects, extended its operation to the wider area of the rule 
of law (strengthening the police sector), and included monitoring borders and peace 
agreements (C-CM).  
 
Since ARF’s inception, it was agreed that ASEAN would be the ‘primary driving 
force’ and would chair the annual meeting (Weber 2013, 351). The European External 
Action Service, in its role as the external arm of the EU, and EU member states 
acknowledged the importance of the ASEAN Regional Forum. They have taken part in 
several ARF work strands (Reiterer 2014, 17), and cooperated with ASEAN in drawing 
and adopting ARF statements. The EU’s commitments were intended to contribute to the 
debate at the Forum where Myanmar participated as a full actor in its capacity as a full 
member of ASEAN since 1997 and a recognised participant in ARF seven years later.  
 
The EU as co-chair of ARF meetings 
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The EU’s ARF position, which could be linked to convincing Myanmar’s junta to 
connect with security cooperation, is examined here through the joint declarations with 
ASEAN. ASEAN was a moderator of any possible EU overtone reproaching Myanmar 
and demanding transformations. The EU’s policy on Myanmar developed through the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctioning the military junta since 1991 
and through the EU-ASEAN dialogue (Marchi 2014). What can be inferred from the 
ARF meetings and declarations has little direct link to Myanmar; to find a direct 
comment on Myanmar’s government, we need to focus on the meeting in Potsdam, in 
2005.  
 
Potsdam: 2005    
At the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building 
Measures, co-chaired by the EU (21-23 February), representatives of Myanmar’s junta 
sought to convince the ARF participants, including the European Union representatives, 
that the course of Myanmar’s reform was on track, namely the implementation of the 
Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy (CSR 2005). The Roadmap was expected to address 
security matters, and was seen to offer an opportunity to implement ‘ceasefire strategies’ 
in Myanmar (Jones 2014, 16). The observance of the Seven Steps programme was a 
matter of interest and preoccupation for ASEAN, firstly, because of their true support for 
a transition in Myanmar and, secondly, because it was expected to soothe international 
agitation with the military junta. This agitation also affected the Association itself 
(Caballero-Antony 2010, 26-7).  
 
ASEAN’s relations with the EU suffered when Myanmar joined ASEAN and, later, 
when it was accepted to ARF (Marchi 2014, 63, 67-8). ASEAN’s ‘completion of the 
vision of the ASEAN founders’ and project of successful regionalism had called for these 
inclusions (Acharya 2002). Hence, in Potsdam, possibly, to break down the wall that 
separated the processes under way in ASEAN as a whole (the integration efforts of 
ASEAN’s regionalism) and Myanmar (the vocal intention to comply with the Seven 
Steps reforms), the EU delegates focused on what they conceivably thought to be the 
success of multilateral participation (that the EU privileged and supported) in 
approaching security situations.  
 
The EU officials focused on threats to non-traditional security, particularly crisis 
prevention, dispute avoidance, management and settlement. They indicated that a 
combined process of multilateral inputs and arrangements, rather than a single country’s 
efforts, more easily antagonised complex situations. Governments acting unilaterally 
were putting themselves at a disadvantage. To that scope, the officials explained the 
concept of the (at that time) European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was 
described as that process which aimed at strengthening the EU’s ‘external ability to act 
through the development of civilian and military capabilities in conflict prevention
3
 and 
crisis management’.  
 
The EU’s action in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU-ALTHEA), as well as its 
contribution towards supporting local authorities to build and safeguard a secure 
environment served to exemplify the specific value attached by the EU to the central role 
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of local authorities in the achievement of security goals. The idea of the role played by 
the EU in preventing and easing crises emerged as a model of the action that ASEAN, its 
members, Myanmar included (and ARF participants) could provide to the region when 
such support seemed necessary to the group (CSR 2005). It was an encouragement to 
take up responsibilities.  
 
Helsinki: 2007, and before, Phnom Penh: 2004, and Berlin: 2008 
In Helsinki, in 2007, at the other ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence 
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy co-chaired by the European Union (28-30 
March), the EU sought to promote confidence building practices through discussing the 
Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) ‘potential for 
strengthening ties with the ARF’ (CSR 2007). Already at a previous meeting that it co-
chaired (Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures), in 2004 (26-
28 October) in Phnom Penh, the EU had succeeded in promoting the inclusion of the 
‘need to maintain informal contacts’ with the OSCE in the ARF’s official position (CSR 
2004). Its message, at that time, focused on showing the two groups’ constructive and 
productive interaction. The EU shared experience of good governance, democratic 
transition, human rights and minority rights with the OSCE.
4
 Hence, in Helsinki, the 
EU’s multilateral influence featured, more intensely, through the explanation (to the 
ASEAN nations, and there within, Myanmar) of the OSCE’s expansion, progress, 
structure and activities (CSR 2007).  
 
The same endeavour was pursued at the successive co-chaired event in Berlin (2008), 
the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia 
and Europe (12-14 March). There, ‘transparency’ and ‘information’ were examined and 
used as examples of practices that could develop and characterise security behaviour 
among the countries of Southeast Asia and other ARF participants. These practices were 
posited as fundamental to a policy associated with an ‘open’ dialogue on security. The 
representatives of the EU argued for the adoption of a common security concept together 
with the development of politically binding standards and the gradual institutionalisation 
of cooperation as processes offering a solid and durable basis for security collaboration 
(CSR 2008). However, the question of whether or not some of these discourses were 
going to create consequences among the regional actors, i.e. ASEAN and Myanmar, 
remained.  
 
Reactions to Cyclone Nargis  
Around the same time as the event in Berlin, in May 2008, Cyclone Nargis ravaged 
Myanmar’s Irrawaddy Delta causing huge destruction and loss of life. It produced 
reactions among the local actors. Initially, with regard to Myanmar, the government was 
overwhelmed by the magnitude and complexity of the disaster relief problems. The 
junta’s attitude, particularly at the beginning of the crisis, in refusing external help, did 
little to diminish the difficulties. The EU, and other external agents, was barred from 
being an actor by the military government’s inflexible non-interference policy (see: Selth 
2008; Haacke 2008). ARF did not enter into action in spite of reports that ‘… it may have 
been that ARF Senior Officials were among the first to meet soon afterwards Nargis had 
struck’ (Haacke and Morada 2010, 228). However, it was ASEAN that was the 
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predominant actor in the cyclone’s circumstance.5 The EU, too, was entangled in several 
new processes induced by cyclone-distressed Myanmar.  
 
ASEAN  
The Association’s activity was vital to the extent that it networked the government in 
Myanmar and other international actors ready to assist. It made possible the constitution 
of the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, led by the ASEAN Secretary General. The 
Task Force operated through the Tripartite Core Group (TCG: the Government of 
Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN), coordinated the relief work and delivered assistance. It 
was the first ASEAN-led mechanism that involved ASEAN member states individually 
and collectively (in addition to the international community and the UN). Its recognised 
value was to have built a regional response to a local problem (C-S, ARF 2008). ASEAN 
acted as a bridge between Myanmar’s government and the donor nations and their 
funding. It allowed, for example, through the TCG, the financing and development of the 
Commission’s Post-Cyclone Nargis recovery and preparedness plan over three years, 
from 2009 (EC 2009). 
 
Myanmar  
What resulted from the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force’s intervention in Myanmar, 
with regard to the military government’s approach to policy-making, was a softened non-
interference stance by the junta (see Cook 2013, 184). The change in Myanmar was 
tangible. This was also confirmed by Brussels, where Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
acknowledged the opening up of an ‘unprecedented dialogue’ with Myanmar’s 
government (which the Commissioner defined as having been paved by the coordinating 
efforts of ASEAN and the UN) (EC 2009).  
 
The EU  
Myanmar’s devastation prompted some new thinking from the European Union (EUC 
2008). The European Council, in November 2008, discussed the state of affairs of the 
European Security and Defence Policy, and argued that, after five years of civilian 
missions, a ‘large body of information and experience [was] available which needed to be 
captured in a systematic lessons learned exercise’ (Council 2008, 16). The exercise led to 
the recognition that the ‘function that [the EU] should play’ in Nargis-like situations 
required the use of a ‘broader understanding of the term to protect [R2P]’ (EUC 2008, 
28).
6
 Human security was a more far-reaching interpretation. More concretely, the new 
EU security policy agreed in December 2008 (i.e. the ‘Report on the Implementation of 
the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’) fixed the 
notion of a ‘shared responsibility to protect populations’ as the new goal enshrined in law 
(IESS 2008, 12). The side effect of cyclone-affected Myanmar contributed towards 
building this certainty.  
 
What the analytical framework reveals about the EU encouraging, at ARF, 
cooperation on security  
 
Emphasis on the EU’s messages  
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As co-chair of the ARF meetings, the EU underscored the multilateral character of its 
position on security, stressing its experience and seeking to inspire others. As an actor 
that has aimed to activate the diverse potential, principles, and competences of its 
partners (EP-C 2013) while operating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, the European 
Union has sought to provide suggestions concerning security cooperation, confidence 
building and disaster relief. 
 
ASEAN 
Yet, the EU and OSCE’s argument that the gradual institutionalisation of cooperation 
underpinned their common action contrasted with ARF’s and ASEAN’s distinctive loose 
character as a collective security arena for dialogue (Heller 2005; ARF-CP 2006). It 
antagonised ASEAN’s low institutionalised cooperation approach.7 Also the suggested 
commitment to an open security dialogue, made distinctive by ‘transparency and sharing 
information’, was, as an official from the EEAS interviewed in Brussels confirmed, out 
of step with the secrecy with which security and defence choices were made in the 
ASEAN group (Interview (A), 2014).  
 
Myanmar 
Myanmar’s leadership, with the obligation that it established in the 2008 constitution to 
preserve the nation’s sovereignty, and, more specifically, the sovereignty of its decision-
making in the field of security, was conceivably indifferent to the messages addressed by 
the EU at the Forum. Incentives to change, promoted by the EU, in favour of Myanmar’s 
transformation were there, spelled out at ARF, ready to be taken up by the military junta. 
The leadership’s declared commitment to implementing the Seven Steps Roadmap to 
Democracy would have implied an embracing of a multifaceted process, with numerous 
preparations and arrangements. A full sequence of actions was required from Myanmar to 
fulfil the Seven Steps programme: convening a National Convention to draft the 
constitution; taking steps to establish democracy after the National Convention was 
concluded; drafting a constitution based on the principles laid down by the National 
Convention; organising a national referendum to approve the redrafted constitution; 
holding free and fair elections for a Parliament; and building a modern and democratic 
nation through the support of the leaders elected by Parliament (Caballero-Antony 2010, 
27).  
 
The encouragement to incorporate fundamental freedoms, minority rights and 
democratic transition into ‘the indivisibility of the security concept’ (as it has been 
embraced by both the EU and OSCE) was an example of the expectations of the junta’s 
steps towards democracy. That progress was, however, irreconcilable with the thinking of 
Myanmar’s administration (Roberts 2010; Farrelly 2013). Also, as an interviewed official 
from the EEAS implied, in the unfortunate case of a crisis occurring in the region, there 
was no chance that Myanmar’s authorities would provide assistance to their ASEAN 
partners, or accept ASEAN’s assistance. In other words, they would not develop a 
multilateral cooperation policy coherent with the EU’s propositions (Interview (B), 
2014).   
 
Social mechanisms and ASEAN  
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However, the reaction among the local actors to the devastation produced by Cyclone 
Nargis revealed fresh developments. ASEAN provided crisis support for Myanmar. How 
could this be the case? Would Checkel give reasons for that result? Checkel (1999) 
explained that there are processes whereby actors acquire new interests and preferences 
through contact with other contexts, either discursive structures or norms. Is this 
argument persuasive? Three points deal with this question: ‘group learning’, ‘ability to 
persuade’ and the ‘crisis’ and ‘policy failure’ argument.  
 
First, there was no lack of transformative discourses at the ARF meetings through 
which to promote ‘group learning’ and dispense norms, as vehicles of new interests 
(Checkel 1999, 548). The Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building 
Measures, the Peacekeeping groups, and those related to Search, Rescue and Disaster 
Relief, received growing support from the personnel from the EU External Service. These 
officials were from the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination section (Interview 
(B), 2014). Officials from the European Commission’s department, providing emergency 
assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters and armed conflict outside the 
European Union, were also in contact with the ARF groups. Frequent exchanges with the 
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) personnel for assistance and 
long-term follow-up were confirmed (Interview (C), 2014). Relations among these 
personnel and the groups’ participants indicate that communication spread and 
competence and knowledge were disseminated. The working clusters, training and 
security exercises, and other groups met several times during 2004-2008. As the 
interviewed EEAS officials acknowledged, it was inevitable that interactions were going 
to develop new interests. The purpose of the frequency and thickness of the networking 
was to promote new learning (Interviews (A) & (B), 2014). This result is congruent with 
Checkel’s belief that ‘where a group met repeatedly, and where there was a high density 
of interactions among participants’ new interests were most likely to be generated (p. 
549).  
 
Second, the ‘ability to persuade’ was not a minor factor contributing to acquire new 
preferences and goals. The EEAS and ECHO personnel, those from OSCE and the EU 
co-chairs, were recognised as having sway over the attendants, during training, and their 
involvement in tuition and assistance in the practical exercises. Whether this result was 
due to their personal ability or to other reasons would seem unclear. Though, the 
interviewed ASEAN leaders close to the ARF organisation (Interviews (D), 2013) and 
Southeast Asian security policy analysts (Interviews (E), 2014) have acknowledged that 
the persons involved in the Forum’s activities, in most cases, had an enhanced persuasive 
capability, which they accredited to the authority of their position. The interviewed 
maintained that the persuasive ability provided guidance, and that guidance had the 
power to influence the actors’ inclinations (Interviews (D), 2013 & (E), 2014). Also this 
result matches Checkel’s suggestion that, when the persuader was an authoritative 
member of the in-group to which the persuadee (e.g. representatives of ASEAN and its 
member states) belonged or wanted to belong, persuasion was most likely to materialise 
(p. 550).  
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Third, also, the ‘crisis’ and ‘policy failure’ dynamics is able to develop new interests 
and roles. Since the Bangkok Declaration was agreed, in 1997, to give shape to the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN set the norm that its group was to remain in a higher 
ranked position compared to the other participants’, due to its role as founder of the 
Forum. Interviewed ASEAN leaders (Interviews (F), 2013) suggested that during the 
‘crisis’ of the cyclone that hit and damaged the Irrawaddy delta, the ASEAN group was 
discouraged. Sensing the emergency on its shoulders, the group felt an added 
responsibility. The role of dealing with the crisis emerged as an obligation. The entire 
region was in a humanitarian and environmental depression, and all ASEAN nations were 
bound to suffer consequences (Interviews (F), 2013). No doubt, the foreign policy of 
Myanmar’s junta was evidence of ‘policy failure’. Refusing the help of external donors, 
whose ships had been left for weeks anchored in the Adaman Sea (Selth 2008), the lack 
of capability to provide assistance to its people was unquestionable. ‘Crisis’ and ‘policy 
failure’ were evident in the context within which the ASEAN’s relief operation took 
place.
8
 These reasons reconnect with Checkel’s account that the development of new 
purposes, commitments and roles was more likely ‘where the group felt itself in a crisis 
or was faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure’ (p. 549).  
 
Then, the interviewees provided several justifications and explanations: the frequency 
and intensity of the groups’ networking was starting to generate new ambitions and 
motivations; the ‘persuasive’ capability of those involved in the Forum’s activities began 
to influence the preferences within the groups; and the duty to assume a leading role in 
assisting Myanmar was supported by the critical situation and, also, by the recognition of 
Myanmar’s policy failure. Did ASEAN respond to the EU’s encouragement to undertake 
responsibilities, and has Checkel’s argument provided reasons for ASEAN’s crisis 
support for Myanmar? The interviewees from the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational 
Coordination section, and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office stated 
that their own activity within the groups and sub-groups had the purpose of transmitting 
new norms, with the aim that these norms would be assimilated and lead to others’ 
undertakings (Interviews (B) and (C), 2014). The interviewees outlined a scenario which 
agreed with Checkel’s account that social dynamics created new drives, which grew via 
contact with other contexts.   
 
The logic of consequences and appropriateness and Myanmar   
The other new development that emerged in connection with Nargis’s devastation was 
the Myanmar junta’s softened non-interference stance. How can I interpret this change? 
Do March and Olsen offer an explanation? These scholars’ logic of expected 
consequences suggests that the strategic calculation of rational bargaining of a 
government’s protection and defence of what it perceives as its national interest 
confronts, but frequently, also, becomes reconciled with the position of other states on the 
same policy issue (March and Olsen 1998, 950). In the post-Nargis situation, the strategic 
calculation of rational bargaining by the Myanmar’s junta challenged the position of the 
other actors, specifically ASEAN, and the ASEAN Secretariat which was willing to 
network with the Myanmar’s government. The rational bargaining challenge was, firstly, 
manifested by the junta’s rejection of external help, and its protection of the political 
   14 
order that it held dear, and the defence of what it perceived to be the national interest 
(Selth 2008; Haacke 2008; Cook 2013).  
 
Only subsequently, a different logic (that March and Olsen explain as the logic of 
appropriateness (1998, 951-2; 2004)) emerged. This logic was manifested by late forces 
for change (Haacke 2008). (i) An interviewed Myanmar historian (Interview (H), 2014) 
believed that the ethical dimension of the responsibility to protect its own people was a 
true response which became more definite only successively. (ii) Also, the collective 
norms of the ASEAN group to reduce the risk to security (as established in the ARF’s 
Concept Paper of 1995) was another encouragement to change that was confirmed by an 
officer of the ASEAN Secretariat (Interview (I), 2013). (iii) A further motive was 
proposed by a Singaporean security analyst (Interview (J), 2014): the collective norm of 
avoiding undermining the efforts of the ASEAN group to strengthen regionalism in 
Southeast Asia. (iv) Another explanation, by the same expert, held that the pressure felt 
by the junta to comply with the Seven Steps programme (combined with the need to be 
more accommodating (Interview (J), 2014) vis-à-vis ASEAN’s offer of networking) acted 
as an incentive to support the new reasoning, which March and Olsen (1998, 2004) 
identify as a logic of appropriateness. (v) An additional motive was suggested by a 
Southeast Asian security analyst (Interview (G), 2014), i.e. the confidence factor 
motivating Myanmar’s junta’s reliance that the mission was to remain under its own 
control. The interviewee contended that the Myanmar government’s control of the 
operation was key to its acceptance. This assertion simply recalls the EU’s efforts, at 
ARF, to develop confidence-building dialogues and generate a reliance on security and 
humanitarian operations.  
 
An evolutionary process took place from the first-mentioned logic to the second. 
Interviewees, i.e. a Myanmar historian, an officer of the ASEAN Secretariat and a 
Singaporean and Southeast Asian security analyst, offered a clue. Several questions 
arose: the ethical dimension, together with the collective norms of the ASEAN group to 
control security, a new-born attention to the ASEAN’s efforts to bolster regionalism, the 
obligation to conform to the Seven Steps agenda, the understanding that cooperation with 
ASEAN was overdue, and the trust that the mission was to remain under the junta’s own 
control. March and Olsen’s argumentation has been beneficial to this analysis and results.  
 
Concerning Myanmar’s acceptance of ASEAN’s (and others’) assistance, could this 
result have any relation with the EU’s efforts in terms of encouraging Myanmar to accept 
multilateral security options? The relation lies in the fact that the motivation to change 
highlighted by the interviewees is the encouragement that the EU proposed at the Forum. 
Undoubtedly, the ethical dimension of the responsibility to protect its own people is 
distinct to the EU, and similarly the belief in the value of collective regional security; 
likewise, the trust in reinforcing regionalism in Southeast Asia is key to both the EU’s 
idea of security and participation in the ARF. That Myanmar’s junta should engage in 
reforms, as advanced by the interviewees, has always been demanded by the EU; and, 
also, the principle of continuing cooperation among the regional partners is something 
that the EU predicates at all times. In the end, the motivation supported by the 
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interviewees appears to be connected with the EU’s encouragement of Myanmar to 
accept multilateral security solutions.   
 
The logic of appropriateness and the EU  
The other observed new development connected with Nargis was the inclusion of ‘shared 
responsibility to protect population’ as a new goal of the EU’s security policy of 
December 2008 (IESS 2008, 12). March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness suggests 
that ‘rules’ associated with specific ‘identities’ and ‘circumstances’ (March and Olsen 
1998, 951) challenged the EU. The circumstance was provided by the EU and 
specifically by the Council re-thinking the EU’s performance, i.e. whether the EU, during 
the Nargis incident, behaved in accordance with its mission and the rules to which it had 
agreed (EUC 2008, 28). The EU had established the norm of readiness ‘to share in the 
responsibility for global security’ in the European Security Strategy (ESS) that the 
Council ratified in 2003. In that document, the EU spelled out that the ‘concept of 
responsibility to protect needed to evolve in response to developments’ (ESS 2003, 1). 
Later, in 2005, the EU was at the forefront of the diplomacy that resulted in the UN 
General Assembly’s agreement with the notion of a ‘responsibility […] to help protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity’ 
(UNGA 2005; Marchi 2011, 157). Notwithstanding the norm that it had fixed in the ESS 
almost five years before the cyclone struck and the progress achieved at the UN, the EU 
was yet ‘normatively un-clear’ on whether it was obliged ‘to assist in circumstances like 
that of Myanmar’s Nargis’ (EUC 2008, 28).  
 
March and Olsen’s appropriateness thinking asserts that ‘action involves evoking an 
identity or role[,] and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific 
situation’ (p. 951). This suggests a link to the EU Council’s new claim as one that was 
motivated by the sense of obligation ingrained in the EU’s identity, its normative 
actorness, and its valued and principled foreign policy (Manners 2002; Lucarelli and 
Manners 2006). It was also motivated by the recommendation embedded in the ESS (of 
evolving the notion concerning ‘when’ the choice to protect became a recognised 
responsibility). The claim upheld that a ‘Europe de la securité humaine’ was a 
sufficiently broad concept for the EU to adopt. It embraced ‘natural disasters’ and 
‘multiple sources of insecurity’, which were associated with Myanmar’s situation (EUC 
2008, 39). The broadened concept was, now, suitable to answer the Council’s question of 
‘whether or not the humanitarian assistance to the people affected by the cyclone, in 
Myanmar, was a reason for the responsibility to protect’ (EUC 2008, 28).  
 
Conclusion  
This article has demonstrated that the EU misses no occasion to stress its interest in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum framework. The ARF is a channel of communication through 
which the EU can promote its identity, distinctiveness, and, in a sense, uniqueness. By 
itself, this dimension and ‘opportunity to transmit messages’ are relevant to the EU and to 
its aspiration to encourage others to conform to the behaviour predicated by its messages. 
Hence, the EU’s role in developing security cooperation with Myanmar at the 2004-2008 
ARF meetings was expressed by the EU’s publicisation of the multilateral aspects of its 
policy in the security area. It was conveyed by its attempts to activate the various 
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energies, drives and abilities of its partners, ASEAN and Myanmar, on the basis of its 
own experience and ambition from which others could benefit. The EU’s role was, also, 
and in particular, manifested through its efforts to encourage both ASEAN to undertake 
responsibilities and Myanmar to take on multilateral security options. This article has 
also shown that the side-effect of Myanmar being hit by Nargis has contributed towards 
prompting the EU Council to upgrade the European foreign and security policy by 
introducing the responsibility to protect as a new goal enshrined in law. Through its focus 
on the ARF as a forum whereby interactions occur, the article has demonstrated not only 
the usefulness of the theories under consideration, but also their complementarity.   
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1 The investigation pays no attention to the EU’s efforts to encourage Myanmar to compromise, or to 
connect with cooperation in the area of security, both up to the current position. It offers no hint at other 
frameworks of security consultation in Asia with which the EU might be involved. It includes no focus on 
the participants in the ARF other than the ASEAN group, Myanmar and the EU; on the ASEAN Regional 
Forum in terms of assessing its operation, on the domestic level of analysis, and the decision-making 
processes. 
2
 For a detailed description of ARF’s activities, see the ARF Concept Paper, 1995 (ARF-CP, 1995).    
3
 Conflict prevention included that range of actions intended to anticipate and deter the outburst of conflict 
(EPLO). 
4
 For OSCE’s attributes, see Galbreath and Brosing (2013, 275-78). 
5
 For an account of ASEAN’s dealing with Cyclone Nargis, see: Haacke (2008, 370-73).  
6
 For a discussion of the factors complicating the responsibility to protect’s implementation in the Asia-
Pacific region, see Weber (2013b, 29-31).  
7
 However, ASEAN was engaged in building a security community among its members, including 
Myanmar (Acharya 2001), and the EU-OSCE’s experience of cooperation could offer inputs to the 
Association’s security community project. 
8
 Southeast Asian security policy analyst (G), questioned in Singapore (February 2014), believed that the 
intervention in Indonesia’s Aceh region, in collaboration with the EU, in 2005, was of support to ASEAN’s 
new initiative. The commentator suggested that the Aceh Monitoring Mission served as a formative 
preparation. It facilitated the institution of the Humanitarian Task Force and the Tripartite Core Group to 
organise the aid work which focused help entirely on Myanmar (Interview (G), 2014).  
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